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I. INTRODUCTION 
The spiraling cost of discovery driven by the explosion in electronically stored 
information is the single most significant problem with the current civil litigation 
system in the United States.1 An anecdotal example illustrates this problem. 
A company was defending a lawsuit in which the plaintiff was seeking $4 million 
in damages.2 As required, the company undertook the process of identifying records 
                                                                                                                                         
 * Assistant Professor at Duquesne University School of Law; J.D., Marshall Wythe 
School of Law at the College of William & Mary; B.A., Yale University. 
 1 Some might counter with the decline in jury trials as a result of the settlement of such a high 
percentage of the cases. See, e.g., Kent D. Syverud, ADR and the Decline of the American Civil 
Jury, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1935, 1943 (1997); Stanley Marcus, J., “Wither the Jury Trial,” 21 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 27, 30 (2008). The response would be that the cost of discovery is at least one of 
the root causes of the settlement or alternative resolution of these cases prior to trial. Others blame 
summary judgment for the demise of the jury trial. See, e.g., Steven B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials 
and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 622 (2004); JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., TRENDS IN 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRACTICE: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 1 (2001), available at 
https://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/summjudg.pdf. However, as noted below, only a small 
fraction (perhaps 5%) of cases are disposed of by summary judgment, whereas the prospect of 
expensive discovery is present in almost every case that survives the motion to dismiss stage. Thus, 
one could argue that the effects of summary judgment on the decline in jury trials is dwarfed by the 
effects of settlements to avoid expensive discovery and the other costs, burdens, and uncertainties of 
the litigation process. 
 2 An in-house lawyer described this experience at the Mini-Conference on Preservation 
and Sanctions held in Dallas in 2011. DISCOVERY SUBCOMM. OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON 
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custodians and preserving their electronically stored information (“ESI”).3 The 
company identified fifty-seven records custodians, and spent approximately $3 
million just to preserve the ESI (most of which the opposing party did not review).4 
That $3 million is currently not recoverable, even if the company prevails on every 
claim and issue in the litigation. The incentive to make a significant payment to 
settle even a wholly frivolous case is apparent when one limited aspect of the e-
discovery process can cost $3 million in a case where $4 million is at issue. 
These numbers are not unique to that particular matter, and they add up system 
wide. The cost to produce one gigabyte of data has been estimated at between $5,000 
and $7,000.5 A significant federal court case may involve the production 500 
gigabytes of data.6 Accordingly, the producing party can spend between $2.5 and 
$3.5 million on e-discovery production in such a case.7 According to a 2010 report, 
litigants spent $2.8 billion on e-discovery in 2009.8 With e-discovery costs 
increasing every year,9 it is not surprising that these costs have an enormous effect 
on civil litigation. 
Against this backdrop of the spiraling cost and burden of the discovery process, 
an issue is percolating through the lower and intermediate courts—the recoverability 
of e-discovery expenses as a component of the costs awarded to the successful party 
under Rule 54(d).10 Two divergent approaches have emerged in the judicial opinions 
and in the limited scholarship addressing the application of Rule 54(d) to e-discovery 
costs. 
                                                                                                                                         
CIVIL RULES, REPORT OF MINI-CONFERENCE ON PRESERVATION AND SANCTIONS 2 (Sept. 2011) 
[hereinafter DISCOVERY]. 
 3 “Electronically stored information,” or ESI, is the term of art under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure for all of the emails, spreadsheets, word processing documents, and other 
information stored on computers and other electronic media. The term was introduced in the 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that went into effect on December 1, 
2006. See generally STEVEN BAICKER-MCKEE, WILLIAM M. JANSSEN & JOHN CORR, FEDERAL 
CIVIL RULES HANDBOOK Pt. III (2007 ed.) and the Advisory Committee Notes to the 2006 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for a more detailed discussion of the 
2006 amendments. 
 4 DISCOVERY, supra note 2, at 2. 
 5 Jacqueline Hoelting, Skin in the Game: Litigation Incentives Changing as Courts 
Embrace a “Loser Pays” Rule for E-Discovery Costs, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1103, 1112 
(2013); INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: A 
VIEW FROM THE FRONT LINES 5 (2008) [hereinafter ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY]. 
 6 ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY, supra note 5, at 5. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Hoelting, supra note 5, at 1112; George Socha & Tom Gelbmann, Climbing Back, LAW 
TECH. NEWS (2010). 
 9 Socha & Gelbmann, supra note 8 (noting that the $2.8 billion spent in 2009 was up 10% 
from 2008). 
 10 As discussed below, Rule 54(d) authorizes the court to award “costs”—but not 
attorney’s fees—to the prevailing party. See infra pp. 15-16. Precisely which costs are 
recoverable is the subject of this article. 
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The first contingent contends that Rule 54(d) is only intended to reimburse the 
prevailing party for a small subset of the total costs that the party has incurred.11 
These jurists and scholars reason that Congressional intent and Supreme Court 
authority so limit the intended scope of the Rule so as to advance the policies 
underlying the American Rule (providing that each party bears its attorney’s fees).12 
The other camp argues for broad transfer of costs to the unsuccessful party, arguing 
that such transfer would help incentivize litigants to be more efficient and measured 
in the manner in which they conduct discovery.13 
This article advocates for a third option—a middle ground between these two 
polar positions that vests the courts with discretion to balance the competing 
concerns and award the prevailing party a greater portion of its costs in appropriate 
circumstances. Such an approach would potentially influence the parties to be more 
measured in their e-discovery requests, and would equip the courts with the tools to 
allocate those costs appropriately among the parties at the end of an adjudication. 
Given the weight of case law that seems to be settling on the narrow interpretation of 
Rule 54(d), this proposal would likely require amendment of the rule, but the 
Supreme Court has not been reluctant to propose rules changes over the last eight 
years, and Congress has allowed each proposed change to go into effect.14 
This article will start with an overview of the e-discovery process, to explain the 
differences between paper discovery (for which Rule 54(d) and the applicable case 
law were designed) and the current discovery processes. The article will then provide 
some additional evidence of the impacts of this e-discovery on the judicial process. 
Next, the article will examine the evolution of Rule 54(d) and the companion statute, 
28 U.S.C. § 1920 in the legislature and the courts. The article will conclude with a 
discussion of the policy concerns implicated by this issue and a proposal to address 
those concerns in a balanced, flexible approach. 
A. Brief Overview of the E-Discovery Process 
Before diving into the case law regarding the recoverability of e-discovery costs, 
it may be helpful to provide a brief overview of the nature of those costs. One model 
for understanding the e-discovery process, and how it differs from the paper 
discovery process, is the Electronic Discovery Reference Model, a model created by 
                                                                                                                                         
 11 See, e.g., Andrew Mast, Cost-Shifting in E-Discovery: Reexamining Zubalake and 28 
U.S.C. § 1920, 56 WAYNE L. REV. 1825, 1838 (2010); John M. Blumers, A Practice in Search 
of a Policy: Considerations of Relative Financial Standing in Cost Awards Under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), 75 B.U. L. REV. 1541, 1566 (1995); Race Tires Am., Inc. v. 
Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158, 169 (3d Cir. 2012); Country Vintner of N.C., LLC 
v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, Inc., 718 F.3d 249, 261 (4th Cir. 2013); CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. 
Return Path, Inc., 737 F.3d 1320, 1327 (11th Cir. 2013).  
 12 See, e.g., Mast, supra note 11, at 1846; Blumers, supra note 11, at 1561; Race Tires, 
674 F.3d at 164; Country Vintner, 718 F.3d at 255; CBT Flint Partners, 737 F.3d at 1327. 
 13 See, e.g., Steven C. Bennett, Are E-Discovery Costs Recoverable by a Prevailing 
Party?, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 537, 555 (2010); Tibble v. Edison Int'l, No. CV 07-5359 
SVW (AGRx), 2011 WL 3759927, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2011); Parrish v. Manatt, Phelps, 
& Phillips, LLP, No. C 10-03200 WHA, 2011 WL 1362112, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2011); 
In re Aspartame Antitrust Litig., 817 F. Supp. 2d 608, 615 (E.D. Pa. 2011). 
 14 See the discussion of the 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, and 2013 amendments and the 2015 
proposed amendments infra Section II. 
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George Socha and Tom Gelbmann in 2005, and which is now widely accepted and 
employed by many e-discovery specialists.15 
The Electronic Discovery Reference Model breaks the e-discovery process into nine 
steps: information management, identification, preservation, collection, processing, 
review, analysis, production, and presentation.16 Information management addresses 
steps to take before litigation occurs to be better prepared for e-discovery, and is 
therefore not relevant to this discussion. Presentation refers to the process of using the 
electronic information at trial or in other legal proceedings, and thus falls outside, and 
after, the discovery process.17  
To some degree, the remaining seven steps involve activities that are part of the 
e-discovery litigation process. Some of them are primarily legal in nature—activities 
that traditionally have been conducted by lawyers and paralegals such as reviewing 
documents for responsiveness and privilege—others are purely technical, and some 
are hybrids. See Figure 1 for a graphic illustration of this process. 
 
Figure 1. 
The identification process entails determining the record custodians—those 
individuals who potentially might have discoverable ESI, and whose records will be 
searched—as well as those technical repositories of ESI that will be searched, such as 
file servers, email servers, desktop and laptop computers, smart phones, backup tapes, 
the cloud,18 etc.19 
                                                                                                                                         
 15 Harrison M. Brown, Searching for an Answer: Defensible E-Discovery Search 
Techniques in the Absence of Judicial Voice, 16 CHAP. L. REV. 407, 416 (2013). 
 16 See EDRM Stages, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY REFERENCE MODEL, 
http://www.edrm.net/resources/edrm-stages-explained (last visited Oct. 29, 2014).  
 17 But note that the costs of presentation are arguably costs that might be recovered under 
28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) (2012) as fees for “exemplification.” 
 18 In this context, the “cloud” refers to the storage of ESI—not on computers or servers owned 
by the party—but instead on servers or media owned by a service provider, which are then accessible 
by any computer or device at any location that has access to the internet. See PETER MELL & 
TIMOTHY GRANCE, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., THE NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD 
COMPUTING, U.S. Dept. of Com. 2 (2011) for a more technical explanation of cloud computing.  
 19 RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, WHERE THE MONEY GOES: UNDERSTANDING LITIGANT 
EXPENDITURES FOR PRODUCING ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY 10 (2012). 
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The next stage of the process includes collection and preservation.20 In this 
stage, the discoverable ESI is captured and preserved, because even accessing files 
without editing them or altering them can change some of their properties (such as 
the field that keeps track of when the document was last opened).21  
After the ESI is collected and preserved, the next stage involves the processing, 
review, and analysis of the ESI. The review and analysis tasks are the processes for 
determining which documents are responsive and for culling privileged documents. 
Parties may use manual reviewers, word searches, or more sophisticated 
technologies like predictive coding,22 alone or in combination. Processing entails 
converting the files into a format that allows the producing party to access the data 
with the software the party uses for its review and analysis.23 
Production is the process of producing the ESI to opposing parties. Production 
may entail converting the ESI to a format that the requesting party has designated, 
and may also include appending electronic bates labels to the documents.24 
This e-discovery process is much more complex than the paper discovery 
process. In the paper world, attorneys and paralegals gather and manually review 
documents for responsiveness and privilege. Although this process can be quite 
expensive depending on the volume of paper, the majority of the expense is readily 
discernable as legal fees, which are generally not recoverable under the American 
Rule.25 The only expenses that many courts consider recoverable “costs” are the 
actual charges for copying the documents necessary for use in the case, which are 
plainly awardable as costs under Rule 54(d).26 Therefore, in the paper discovery 
arena, the parties and courts can easily determine which costs are potentially eligible 
for recovery under Rule 54(d). 
Many of the e-discovery functions are not so easily categorized, lying 
somewhere in between traditional legal work and the purely mechanical process of 
copying paper documents. These hybrid functions may not be performed by law 
firms or anyone with legal training, but rather are often contracted out to firms 
employing people with computer or related technical training. 
Some of these hybrid tasks are the functional equivalent of the legal work 
performed by lawyers on paper documents. After the electronic data is gathered, an 
e-discovery consultant may run word searches to select documents that are likely to 
be responsive or relevant. Attorneys or paralegals typically then review the selected 
documents and make the final determination as to whether to make those documents 
available to the opposing party. In many ways, running these searches is simply 
using a computer to make the first pass through the documents for responsiveness—
a traditionally legal task. Yet the task is performed by people who have technical 
                                                                                                                                         
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. at 11. 
 22 See the discussion of predictive coding infra p. 7. 
 23 RAND INST., supra note 19, at 11. 
 24 Id. at 12. 
 25 Under the American Rule, each party generally bears its own attorney’s fees regardless 
of which party prevails. See infra p. 15. 
 26 See, e.g., BDT Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 405 F.3d 415, 420 (6th Cir. 2005). 
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training, not legal training, and the legal review still occurs in a separate step. Should 
the expenses of conducting the search be considered legal fees or costs? 
Searching using predictive coding is perhaps incrementally closer to legal 
analysis because it is not purely mechanical.27 With predictive coding, the software 
uses artificial intelligence to identify potentially responsive documents, not simple 
Boolean searches.28 The program essentially learns the case from information that 
the lawyers input, and can find responsive documents that word searches or people 
might miss. Again, however, the task is performed by people who have technical 
training, not legal training, and the legal review still occurs in a separate step. 
Other tasks have no analog in the paper discovery process. For example, unless 
the parties have agreed not to produce metadata,29 technical personnel must take 
steps to preserve the metadata, because otherwise the metadata may be altered by the 
processes used to review the ESI.30 Likewise, if the parties are not producing 
documents in their native format,31 technical personnel must take additional steps to 
associate the metadata with the document images.32 The concept of metadata is 
foreign to the paper document process, so the courts have no historical basis to 
categorize metadata costs as more like traditional legal work or more like traditional 
costs. 33 
                                                                                                                                         
 27 For a description of predictive coding and some of the issues it raises, see, for example, 
Charles Yablon & Nick Landsman-Roos, Predictive Coding: Emerging Questions and 
Concerns, 64 S.C. L. REV. 633 (2013). 
 28 Id. at 637. 
 29 “Metadata” refers to the data that many programs or computers store in hidden fields 
that pertain to the document in question. For example, many word processing programs store 
information about who created the document, when the document was created, who modified 
the document, when it was modified, etc. Discovery parties often want access to this metadata, 
as well as to the underlying document. For a detailed description of metadata, see NAT’L INFO. 
STANDARDS ORG,. UNDERSTANDING METADATA (2004). 
 30 See 126 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 281 (2014); CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return 
Path, Inc., 737 F.3d 1320, 1329 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 31 “Native format” refers to the default format in which an application typically stores 
data. For example, Excel stores data in a spreadsheet with a .xls or .xlsx file name. A 
spreadsheet produced in that format will contain all of the formulae used to make the 
calculations in the spreadsheet. A spreadsheet that is printed out on paper or saved in a 
different format that simply creates an image (such as a pdf or a tif) ordinarily will not contain 
the formulae. See LEXISNEXIS, THE TRUTH ABOUT NATIVE FILE REVIEW 3 (2006).  
 32 Id. 
 33 See Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Discoverability of Metadata, 29 A.L.R. 6TH 167 
(2007):  
The group of judges and attorneys comprising the Sedona Conference Working Group 
on Best Practices for Electronic Document Retention and Production (Sedona 
Electronic Document Working Group) identified metadata as one of the primary ways 
in which producing electronic documents differs from producing paper documents. 
The Sedona Electronic Document Working Group also recognized that understanding 
when metadata should be specifically preserved and produced represents one of the 
biggest challenges in electronic document production.”)  
Id. (citations omitted). 
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Sometimes, the particular steps that a party takes in the e-discovery process are 
individually determined by that party, using its judgment as to the most substantively 
effective and cost-effective method. In the paper world, that was almost always the 
case. In the e-discovery context, however, parties increasingly reach agreement 
before the fact as to how they will handle ESI. Rule 26(f) requires the parties to meet 
and discuss a variety of discovery issues and to prepare a proposed discovery plan 
that they submit to the court.34 The manner of handling ESI is on the list of topics 
that parties must discuss.35 
In the e-discovery era, however, sometimes the court specifies the e-discovery 
processes the parties must employ. Typically, in these cases, the court uses the 
parties’ Rule 26(f) discovery plan as a starting point and issues a case management 
order with a high level of detail regarding the parties’ ESI obligations, something 
that would be almost unheard of in the paper discovery environment. For example, in 
one of the cases discussed below, the case management order addressed the 
following e-discovery topics: the manner for determining keyword search terms and 
the parties’ satisfaction of their obligations through the keyword searching process; 
the format for ESI production and preparation for use in e-discovery software 
packages; electronic Bates labeling; unitization of the documents; production of 
specific metadata; and the generation of an extracted text file or searchable version 
for each electronic document.36 
The costs of these tasks vary widely depending on factors such as the quantity and 
nature of the data. In a case study of these costs, the Rand Institute for Civil Justice 
reported costs ranging from a low of $17,000 in an intellectual property case to a high of 
more than $20 million in two products liability cases.37 These are the costs that 
prompted the Supreme Court to write, “the threat of discovery expense will push cost-
conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching those proceedings.”38 
The next section will consider which of these costs are recoverable to the prevailing 
party under the cost recovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
III. EVIDENCE OF THE CONCERN OVER THE EFFECTS OF HIGH DISCOVERY COSTS ON 
THE LITIGATION PROCESS 
Evidence of the degree of concern over this issue is manifest on many fronts. 
Two examples serve to illustrate this point. 
In 2007 and 2010, the United States Supreme Court issued two landmark 
decisions on the pleading standard in federal court, Bell Atlantic Corporation v. 
Twombly39 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.40 In Bell Atlantic, the Supreme Court announced 
                                                                                                                                         
 34 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f). 
 35 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)(C) (the parties should discuss “any issues about disclosure or 
discovery of electronically stored information, including the form or forms in which it should 
be produced”). 
 36 See the discussion of Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158 
(2012) infra pp. 20-22. 
 37 RAND INST., supra note 19, at 17. 
 38 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007). 
 39 Id. at 544. 
 40 556 U.S. 662 (2010). 
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the plausibility standard for pleading, and in Iqbal the Court confirmed that the new 
plausibility standard applies generally to all cases, not only to antitrust cases.  
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to contain a 
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief.”41 This standard is often referred to as “notice pleading,” and contrasted with 
“fact pleading” regimes.42 In 1957, the Supreme Court issued the definitive opinion 
interpreting this language in Conley v. Gibson.43 In Conley, the Court wrote, “a 
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears 
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 
would entitle him to relief.”44 In the ensuing years, lower courts have recited that 
language thousands of times when adjudicating motions to dismiss.45 This was the 
language explaining the pleading standard under Rule 8. 
In Twombly, the court characterized the “no set of facts” language as “best 
forgotten,”46 and substituted a standard where the complaint must allege sufficient 
facts so as to state a claim that the court deems to be, not just possible (i.e., passing 
the “no set of facts” test), but “plausible.”47 
So, in 1957, the Supreme Court instructed that Rule 8’s “short and plain 
statement” language meant that a complaint survived a motion to dismiss unless the 
court could conceive of no set of facts that would support the claims in the 
complaint. That standard stood, unchanged just as the language in Rule 8 was 
unchanged, for 50 years. Then, in 2007, the Court announced that the same language 
in Rule 8 would henceforth be construed to mean something new. Essentially, one 
could argue, the Court amended Rule 8 unilaterally, bypassing the established 
process for amending the rules by proposing rule amendments to Congress for its 
approval.48 
                                                                                                                                         
 41 FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 
 42 Veazey v. Commc’ns and Cable of Chi., Inc., 194 F.3d 850, 854 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 43 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 44 Id. at 45-46. 
 45 Although the courts intoned this language over and over again, there is some 
disagreement as to whether the trial courts ever followed the Conley language literally. See 
William M. Janssen, Iqbal “Plausibility” in Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Litigation, 
71 LA. L. REV. 541, 550 (2011) (describing Judge Posner’s statement that although “the 
exceedingly forgiving attitude toward pleading deficiencies that was expressed . . . in Conley 
v. Gibson . . . continues to be quoted with approval, it has never been taken literally.”). 
 46 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007). 
 47 Id. at 570. 
 48 Courts, legislators, and legal scholars differ markedly in their assessment of Twombly 
and Iqbal and their likely effects on federal litigation, with some decrying them as “an assault 
on our democratic principles” and others seeing the opinions as having “little or no impact” on 
dismissals. See Janssen, supra note 45, at 566-69. Certainly, not everyone would agree that the 
Court’s Twombly and Iqbal opinions amounted to an ultra vires amendment of Rule 8. While 
reasonable minds can differ about the ultimate effects of these cases, it is beyond peradventure 
that these cases received a degree of national attention that few procedural cases achieve and 
that the basis for the Court’s decision was the high cost of discovery.  
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What led the Court to take such an extraordinary measure? The Court told us. In 
explaining why the courts should use the pleading standard to weed out cases that do 
not meet the heightened plausibility standard, rather than counting on the discovery 
process to identify cases that lack support, the Court noted that “discovery accounts 
for as much as 90 percent of litigation costs when discovery is actively employed.”49 
The court also observed that, “the threat of discovery expense will push cost-
conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching those 
proceedings.”50 Then, in Iqbal, the court wrote, “Rule 8 marks a notable and 
generous departure from the hyper-technical, code pleading regime of a prior era, but 
it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more 
than conclusions.”51 Thus, the Court stated very clearly that it (unilaterally and 
without Congressional approval) raised the bar for pleading a claim in order to 
prevent plaintiffs with “anemic” cases from extracting settlements from defendants 
seeking to avoid the high costs of discovery.52 
More evidence of the concerns about the increasing costs of discovery and the 
effects of such costs on our judicial system can be found in the recent amendments to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The last ten years have seen a remarkable 
number of substantive revisions to the Rules, and the focus of many of these 
amendments has been the discovery rules. 2006 brought the e-discovery 
amendments. These amendments: clarified that all ESI is subject to discovery; 
required early attention to details regarding e-discovery through the discovery 
conference and discovery plan process; limited discovery of ESI that is not 
“reasonably accessible”; added procedures for recalling inadvertently produced 
privileged matter (a particular risk with ESI); and created a safe harbor for the 
destruction of ESI as the result of the routine operation of computer systems.53  
The 2007 and 2009 amendments included, but did not focus on, the discovery 
rules. 2007 brought the “Restyling Project,” in which virtually every rule was 
rewritten.54 The 2009 amendments changed the computation for many of the time 
periods in the Rules.55 But the 2010 amendments returned the focus to discovery, 
with the expert discovery amendments that shielded draft reports and certain other 
                                                                                                                                         
 49 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (citing Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to Hon. Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Committee on Rules 
of Practice and Procedure (May 11, 1999), 192 F.R.D. 354, 357 (2000)). 
 50 Id. 
 51 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2010). 
 52 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559. 
 53 See STEVEN BAICKER-MCKEE, JANSSEN & CORR, supra note 3 for a more detailed 
discussion of the 2006 amendments. 
 54 See STEVEN BAICKER-MCKEE, WILLIAM M. JANSSEN & JOHN CORR, FEDERAL CIVIL 
RULES HANDBOOK Pt. III (2008 ed.) and the Advisory Committee Notes to the 2007 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for a more detailed discussion of the 
2007 amendments. 
 55 See STEVEN BAICKER-MCKEE, WILLIAM M. JANSSEN & JOHN CORR, FEDERAL CIVIL 
RULES HANDBOOK Pt. III (2010 ed.)  and the Advisory Committee Notes to the 2009 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for a more detailed discussion of the 
2009 amendments. 
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communications with testifying experts.56 And the 2013 amendments changed the 
process for issuing subpoenas under Rule 45 and for sanctioning non-compliance 
under Rule 37.57 
Moreover, the Advisory Committee has proposed amendments to the discovery 
rules that are currently on schedule to go into effect in 2015 that would make the 
most significant changes to the discovery process since the addition of the automatic 
disclosures twenty years ago.58 Those proposed amendments would change 
“proportionality” from a component of the Rule 26(c) process for protective orders 
to the core definition for discoverability, and allow parties to object to discovery on 
the grounds that the burden of the requested discovery outweighs its likely benefits.59 
They would also reduce the presumptive limits for interrogatories (from 25 to 15) 
and depositions (from ten depositions at up to seven hours to five depositions at up 
to six hours), and add a new limit of 25 requests for admission.60 
Although the proposed amendments do not add a limit on document requests, 
they do change some important procedures for document discovery. They would 
allow parties to serve document requests at an earlier stage of the proceeding.61 They 
also change the rules for objecting to document requests, adding an express 
requirement that objections be stated with specificity62 and requiring the objecting 
party to specify whether it was withholding any documents on the basis of its 
objections.63 The amendments further require that, when a party is producing the 
                                                                                                                                         
 56 See STEVEN BAICKER-MCKEE, WILLIAM M. JANSSEN & JOHN CORR, FEDERAL CIVIL 
RULES HANDBOOK Pt. III (2011 ed.) and the Advisory Committee Notes to the 2010 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for a more detailed discussion of the 
2010 amendments. 
 57 See STEVEN BAICKER-MCKEE, WILLIAM M. JANSSEN & JOHN CORR, FEDERAL CIVIL 
RULES HANDBOOK Pt. III (2014 ed.) and the Advisory Committee Notes to the 2013 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for a more detailed discussion of the 
2013 amendments. 
 58 See Marc A. Goldich, David R. Cohen & Emily J. Dimond, FRCP Amendments Could 
Change Discovery As We Know It,  
LAW360 (June 4, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/447209/frcp-amendments-could-
change-discovery-as-we-know-it. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Currently, no discovery requests may be served prior to the parties’ discovery 
conference under Rule 26(f). Under the proposed amendment, parties could serve document 
requests prior to the conference, and they would be deemed served on the date of the 
conference, enabling the parties to start document discovery earlier and to discuss issues 
raised by document discovery at the Rule 26(f) conference and with the court at the initial 
Rule 16 conference. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, AGENDA BOOK 81-82 (Apr. 2013). 
 62 Unlike Rule 33, which requires objections to interrogatories to be stated with 
specificity, Rule 34 does not contain that express requirement. Many courts have imposed it 
nonetheless. See STEVEN BAICKER-MCKEE, WILLIAM M. JANSSEN & JOHN CORR, FEDERAL 
CIVIL RULES HANDBOOK Pt. III, Rule 34 (2013 ed.); U.S. v. Philip Morris Inc., 347 F.3d 951, 
954 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The proposed amendment makes this requirement explicit and 
consistent. 
 63 Currently, parties often interpose objections to document requests, and then state that, 
without waiving the objections, they will produce nonprivileged responsive documents. This 
 
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss2/9
2015] THE AWARD OF E-DISCOVERY COSTS 407 
 
documents rather than permitting inspection of them, the party must produce them at 
the time of the response or at another reasonable time specified in the response, and 
authorizes sanctions for failure to do so.64 
Lastly, the proposed amendments change the sanctions in Rule 37(e) for 
spoliation of evidence. Currently, Rule 37(e) shields a party from sanctions for the 
loss of ESI “as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic 
information system.”65 That safe haven would be deleted, and instead the rules 
would expressly authorize spoliation sanctions if the loss of the evidence was 
willful, in bad faith, grossly negligent, or negligent, but only if the loss of evidence 
caused “substantial prejudice” or “irreparably deprived a party of any meaningful 
opportunity to present or defend against the claims in the action.”66  
These proposed 2015 amendments, like the expert discovery amendments of 
2010 and certain aspects of the e-discovery amendments of 2006, contrast with the 
historical trend of expanding discovery; these amendments represent a significant 
reversal of that trend.67 Thus, after years and years of expanding federal court 
discovery and judicial references to the “liberal” nature of discovery68 under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court and the Advisory Committee 
have shifted into reverse and are restricting the scope of discovery. 
IV. THE HISTORY OF COST RECOVERY IN THE U.S.  
A. Congress Sets the Rules for Recovery 
Under British and U.S. common law, the courts are not permitted to award costs 
to the prevailing party.69 British courts, however, have long been authorized by 
statute to award attorney’s fees and costs to successful litigants. As early as 1278, 
the courts of England were authorized to award counsel fees to successful plaintiffs 
in litigation.70 It remains customary in England to award both costs and fees to a 
prevailing party, and the parties regularly conduct separate hearings before special 
                                                                                                                                         
practice leaves the propounding party uncertain as to whether the objections raise hypothetical 
concerns about the phrasing of the request or are the basis for withholding otherwise 
responsive documents. The amendment would remove this ambiguity.  
 64 Again, this amendment addresses an existing practice in which the responding party 
simply indicates that it will produce responsive documents “at a mutually convenient time,” 
leaving the parties to wrangle over that time and leading to further delay. See ADVISORY 
COMM. ON CIVIL RULES 16 (May 2013).  
 65 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
 66 Goldich, Cohen & Dimond, supra note 58. 
 67 Id. (“While historically most amendments to the rules have broadened discovery 
obligations, there now appears to be wide support for proposals aimed at getting discovery 
back under control.”). 
 68 See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 512 (1947); Dart Indus. Co., Inc. v. 
Westwood Chem. Co., Inc., 649 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1980); Justiano v. G4S Secure 
Solutions, Inc., 291 F.R.D. 80, 83 (D.N.J. 2013). 
 69 See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). 
 70 Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967). 
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“Taxing Masters” in order to determine the appropriateness and the size of an award 
of counsel fees.71 
The United States rejected the British approach to the shifting of attorney’s fees. 
In 1796, the Supreme Court recognized that “[t]he general practice of the United 
States is in opposition to” the awarding of counsel fees to the prevailing 
party.72Although many commentators recommend the “loser pays” English Rule,73 
the American Rule remains firmly in place.74 
The U.S. departure from the British system is not quite so absolute with regard to 
the taxation of costs. Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that, unless federal statute, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or a court order 
provide otherwise, “costs—other than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the 
prevailing party.”75 Although that language would seem on its face plainly to 
encompass all costs of litigation “other than attorney’s fees,” the courts have 
interpreted Rule 54(d) to allow only the recovery of costs described in 28 U.S.C. § 
1920.76 
Congress enacted Section 1920 in 1948, but the history of cost recovery in the 
U.S. predates the enactment of Section 1920 by 155 years. In 1793, Congress 
enacted a statute that authorized courts to award certain costs to prevailing parties 
when so authorized under state law.77 Under this statute, federal courts awarded both 
                                                                                                                                         
 71 Id. Note, however, that the English system is not strictly a loser pays approach, but 
rather occupies a middle ground in which the prevailing party typically recovers some, but not 
all, of its fees as allocated by a taxing Master. See Arthur Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 
856 (1929). 
 72 Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306, 306 (1796). 
 73 See, e.g., Marie Gryphon, Assessing The Effects of a “Loser Pays” Rule on the 
American Legal System: An Economic Analysis and Proposal for Reform, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 567 (2011); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Indemnity or Compensation? The Contract 
With America, Loser-Pays Attorney Fee Shifting, and a One-Way Alternative, 37 WASHBURN 
L.J. 317 (1988); Lorraine Wright Feuerstein, Two-Way Fee Shifting on Summary Judgment or 
Dismissal: An Equitable Deterrent to Unmeritorious Lawsuits, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 125 (1995); 
Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 792 
(1966). 
 74 See, e.g., John Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured 
Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1569 (1993). 
 75 The full text of Rule 54(d)(1) states, 
Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs—other 
than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party. But costs against the 
United States, its officers, and its agencies may be imposed only to the extent allowed 
by law. The clerk may tax costs on 14 days’ notice. On motion served within the next 
7 days, the court may review the clerk’s action. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 54 (d)(1). 
 76 See, e.g., Taniguchi v. Kan. Pac. Saipan, LTD., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2005 (2012); W. Va. 
Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 86 (1991) (Section 1920 “define[s] the full extent of 
a federal court's power to shift litigation costs absent express statutory authority.”). 
 77 Judiciary Act of 1793, § 4, 1 Stat. 333 (1793); see also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. 
Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247–48 (1975). 
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attorney’s fees and other costs to the prevailing party if the forum state’s high court 
provided for such recovery. Although the statute expired after six years, the practice 
continued until Congress enacted another act in 1853 to address the taxation of costs 
and fees.78 
Congress had at least two purposes in enacting the 1853 act. First, there was no 
consistency in the manner in which different federal courts awarded costs and fees, 
and second, losing litigants were bearing attorney’s fees that “have been swelled to 
an amount exceedingly oppressive to suitors, and altogether disproportionate to the 
magnitude and importance of the causes in which they are taxed, or the labor 
bestowed.”79 Thus, the purpose of the 1853 act was to mandate a consistent approach 
to costs and fees that prevented an unreasonable burden on the losing party. The 
language of the 1853 act was carried forward with little or no change in the Revised 
Statutes of 1874 and by the Judicial Code of 1911.80 Its substance was then included 
in the Revised Code of 1948 as 28 U.S.C. § 1920, where it currently resides.81 
In 1948 when Congress enacted Section 1920, the discovery world was a much 
simpler place. Secretaries took dictation by shorthand, typed correspondence and 
other documents on typewriters—using carbon paper if they needed duplicates—and 
stored them in metal filing cabinets. Discovery primarily meant rifling through a 
couple of drawers in those filing cabinets looking for responsive documents. 
The 1948 version of Section 1920 provided that: 
                                                                                                                                         
 78 See Taniguchi, 132 S. Ct. at 2001. 
 79 See the remarks of Senator Bradbury, CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 2d Sess., 207 (1853):  
There is now no uniform rule either for compensating the ministerial officers of the 
courts, or for the regulation of the costs in actions between private suitors. One system 
prevails in one district, and a totally different one in another; and in some cases it 
would be difficult to ascertain that any attention had been paid to any law whatever 
designed to regulate such proceedings . . . . It will hence be seen that the compensation 
of the officers, and the costs taxed in civil suits, is made to depend in a great degree on 
that allowed in the State courts. There are no two States where the allowance is the 
same. When this system was adopted, it had the semblance of equality, which does not 
now exist. There were then but sixteen States, in all of which the laws prescribed 
certain taxable costs to attorneys for the prosecution and defense of suits. In several of 
the States which have since been added to the Union, no such cost is allowed; and in 
others the amount is inconsiderable. As the State fee bills are made so far the rule of 
compensation in the Federal courts, the Senate will perceive that totally different 
systems of taxation prevail in the different districts . . . . It is not only the officers of 
the courts, but the suitors also, that are affected by the present unequal, extravagant, 
and often oppressive system. 
 
The abuses that have grown up in the taxation of attorneys' fees which the losing party 
has been compelled to pay in civil suits, have been a matter of serious complaint. The 
papers before the committee show that in some cases those costs have been swelled to 
an amount exceedingly oppressive to suitors, and altogether disproportionate to the 
magnitude and importance of the causes in which they are taxed, or the labor 
bestowed. 
Id.  
 80 See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 421 U.S. at 256. 
 81 Id. 
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A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the 
following: 
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal; 
(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic 
transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case; 
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses; 
(4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained 
for use in the case; and 
(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title. 
In terms of the recovery of ESI costs, the key language resides in Section 
1920(4)—“Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for 
use in the case.”  
In 1978, Congress amended Section 1920 to add a sixth category of taxable costs, 
costs for interpreters. The statute remained unchanged until 2008, when Congress 
made modest changes to subsections (2) and (4) to address certain electronic costs. 
Congress revised subsection (2) to cover fees for “printed or electronically recorded 
transcripts” and revised subsection (4) to substitute “copies of materials” for “copies 
of papers.”82 
In the House, Representative Zoe Lofgren described the bill as a collection of 
“noncontroversial measures proposed by the Judicial Conference to improve 
efficiency in the Federal courts.”83 She also noted that the legislation would “mak[e] 
electronically produced information coverable in court costs.”84  
This simple change from “papers” to “materials” belies the complex differences 
between making paper copies and making electronic copies. As discussed above, the 
process of gathering, processing, and producing ESI is a multi-step process, some or 
all of which might be considered part and parcel of the “fees for . . . copies of 
materials necessarily obtained for use in the case.” The next section describes the 
courts’ grappling with this issue. 
B. The Courts Interpret the Rules 
Before facing issues regarding e-discovery costs, the courts considered a number 
of issues related to the award of copying costs under Section 1920(4). When Section 
1920 was enacted, “copying” meant hand transcribing a proceeding or document.85 
Since the advent of photocopying technology, however, prevailing parties have 
routinely relied on Section 1920(4) to recover photocopying costs.86 Courts also 
addressed whether Section 1920(4) requires that documents must have been offered 
at trial or as an exhibit to a motion for their copying costs to be eligible for award to 
                                                                                                                                         
 82 Judicial Administration and Technical Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–406, 
122 Stat. 4291, 4292 (2008) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2) & (4)). 
 83 154 Cong. Rec. H10271 (Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Rep. Lofgren).  
 84 Id. 
 85 See Country Vintner of N.C., LLC v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, Inc., 718 F.3d 249, 258 (4th 
Cir. 2013). 
 86 See, e.g., Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 924 F.2d 
633, 643 (7th Cir. 1991); Tokyo Electron Ariz., Inc. v. Discreet Indus. Corp., 215 F.R.D. 60, 
65 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); Gen. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Stanchfield, 23 F.R.D. 58, 60 (D. Mont. 1959).  
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the prevailing party.87 Courts concluded that Section 1920(4) applies to documents 
obtained during discovery, even if not introduced at trial or in a motion based on the 
contrast between the language in earlier cost statutes (allowing costs of copies of 
papers necessarily obtained for use on trial) and Section 1920(4) (allowing costs of 
making copies necessarily obtained for use in the case).88 
Courts also considered whether to interpret Section 1920 narrowly or broadly. 
The Supreme Court has observed that taxable costs under the statute are “modest in 
scope” and “limited to relatively minor, incidental expenses”:  
[Section] 1920 . . . lists such items as clerk fees, court reporter fees, 
expenses for printing and witnesses, expenses for exemplification and 
copies, docket fees, and compensation of court-appointed experts. Indeed, 
the assessment of costs most often is merely a clerical matter that can be 
done by the court clerk. Taxable costs are a fraction of the nontaxable 
expenses borne by litigants for attorneys, experts, consultants, and 
investigators. It comes as little surprise, therefore, that costs almost 
always amount to less than the successful litigant’s total expenses in 
connection with a lawsuit.89 
When the courts turned to the issue of how Section 1920(4) applies to the costs 
of e-discovery, there was significant disagreement. A number of district courts took 
a broad view of revised Section 1920(4) and construed it to include most of the 
services an e-discovery consultant would provide. 
Perhaps the most frequently cited case for this interpretation is Judge Thomas W. 
Thrash, Jr.’s opinion in CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc.90 In this patent 
case, the prevailing defendant sought $243,453.02 charged by an e-discovery vendor 
to “collect, search, identify and help produce electronic documents from [the 
defendant’s] network files and hard drives in response to [the plaintiff’s] discovery 
requests.”91 Judge Thrash noted that the services that the vendor provided are “highly 
technical,” and “not the type of services that attorneys or paralegals are trained for or 
are capable of providing.”92 He also noted the defendant’s undisputed contention that 
                                                                                                                                         
 87 See Country Vintner, 718 F.3d at 257. 
 88 See In re Ricoh Co., Ltd. Patent Litig., 661 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (applying 
Ninth Circuit law) (“Under section 1920(4), exemplification and copying costs for producing 
documents in discovery are recoverable.”); Rundus v. City of Dallas, Tex., 634 F.3d 309, 316 
(5th Cir. 2011) (“[C]osts incurred merely for discovery. . . . [a]re recoverable if the party 
making the copies has a reasonable belief that the documents will be used during trial or for 
trial preparation.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); U.S. E.E.O.C. v. W & O, Inc., 213 F.3d 
600, 623 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Copies attributable to discovery are a category of copies 
recoverable under § 1920(4).”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Illinois v. Sangamo Constr. 
Co., 657 F.2d 855, 867 (7th Cir. 1981) (affirming taxation of costs of copying discovery 
documents because the “expense of copying materials reasonably necessary for use in the case 
are recoverable costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4),” and “[t]he underlying documents need not 
be introduced at trial in order for the cost of copying them to be recoverable”). 
 89 Taniguchi v. Kan. Pac. Saipan, LTD., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2006 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 90 CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 2d 1376 (N.D. Ga. 2009). 
 91 Id. at 1381. 
 92 Id. 
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making paper copies of the more than 1.4 million documents and the source code 
involved would actually have cost more than the amount that the vendor charged.93 
He reasoned that broad taxation of e-discovery costs would promote caution in 
making overly burdensome ESI demands: “Taxation of these costs will encourage 
litigants to exercise restraint in burdening the opposing party with the huge cost of 
unlimited demands for electronic discovery.”94 Based upon these considerations, he 
denied the plaintiff’s objections to the e-discovery costs.95  
Other early district court decisions allowing the recovery of various e-discovery 
costs include: Tibble v. Edison Int'l96 (more than $500,000 in electronic discovery 
costs “necessarily incurred” to respond to plaintiff’s discovery requests were 
taxable); Parrish v. Manatt, Phelps, & Phillips, LLP97 (“The tasks of collecting 
client documents, reviewing those documents, and determining which documents are 
relevant are essential—and often costly—parts of investigation and discovery.”); In 
re Aspartame Antitrust Litig.98 (“The court is persuaded that in cases of this 
complexity, e-discovery saves costs overall by allowing discovery to be conducted in 
an efficient and cost-effective manner.”).  
Other district court judges took the opposite view, interpreting Section 1920 
narrowly. These courts generally reasoned that costs for paper copies are limited to 
the charges for pushing the “copy” button on the copying machine, and costs for 
electronic copying should be similarly limited to the scanning or duplicating of the 
electronic files, and should not include the costs of locating or processing the files.  
Thus, in Fells v. Virginia Department of Transportation,99 the prevailing party 
sought costs associated with “electronic records initial processing, Metadata 
extraction, [and] file conversion.” While the party’s ESI project manager testified 
that these activities were “much like photocopying or scanning of paper records,” the 
court denied recovery of costs because the project manager “did not testify that these 
techniques are photocopying or scanning.”100 Likewise, in Kellogg Brown & Root 
Int’l, Inc. v. Altanmia Commercial Mktg. Co., W.L.L.,101 the court reasoned that 
extracting and storing electronic data was more like the work of an attorney in 
finding and sorting documents for discovery than copying documents. In Mann v. 
                                                                                                                                         
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 As discussed infra p. 23, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently reversed 
Judge Thrash in CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc., 654 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 
2013), which is in line with the other circuit courts to address this issue. 
 96 Tibble v. Edison Intern., No. CV 07-5359 SVW (AGRx), 2011 WL 3759927, at *7 
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2011). 
 97 Parrish v. Manatt, Phelps, & Phillips, LLP., No. C10-03200WHA, 2011 WL 1362112, 
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2011). 
 98 In re Aspartame Antitrust Litig., 817 F. Supp. 2d 608, 615 (E.D. Pa. 2011). 
 99 Fells v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 605 F. Supp. 2d 740 (E.D. Va. 2009). 
 100 Id. at 743. 
 101 Kellogg Brown & Root Int’l, Inc. v. Altanmia Commercial Mktg. Co., W.L.L., No. H-
07-2684, 2009 WL 1457632, at *6 (S.D. Tex. 2009). 
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Heckler & Koch Defense, Inc.,102 the court observed that “such tasks as ‘Searching 
and Deduping,’ and ‘Creation of Native File Database with Full Text and Metadata 
Extraction’” do not qualify as “copying.” In In re Scientific–Atlanta, Inc. Securities 
Litigation,103 the court analogized keyword searching to reviewers physically 
reviewing paper documents; just as the cost of reviewers examining documents is 
not taxable, so too the task of keyword searching is not taxable. And in In re Fast 
Memory Erase v. Spansion, Inc.,104 the court found that data collection and extraction 
of relevant discoverable ESI was more like non-taxable attorney and paralegal 
review than copying.  
Three recent opinions from the federal courts of appeals seem to have resolved 
this disagreement among the district courts. The first was the decision from the 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Race Tires America, Inc. v. Hoosier Racing 
Tire Corp.105 After granting Hoosier Racing Tire Corp.’s motion for summary 
judgment in this antitrust case, the trial court awarded Hoosier approximately 
$365,000 in costs under Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The vast 
majority of these costs represented charges from e-discovery vendors for activities 
like hard drive imaging, data processing, keyword searching, and file format 
conversion. 
Moreover, many of these activities were actually required by the court. The Case 
Management Order (“CMO”) directed the parties to attempt to agree upon a list of 
keyword search terms, with a party’s use of such terms carrying a presumption that it 
had fulfilled its “obligation to conduct a reasonable search.”106 The CMO further 
required the parties to produce ESI documents in Tagged Image File Format,” 
accompanied by “[a] cross reference or unitization file, in standard format (e.g. 
Opticon, Summation DII, or the like)107 showing the Bates number of each page and 
the appropriate unitization of the documents.”108 The CMO identified specific 
metadata fields that the parties had to produce if reasonably available.109 Finally, the 
CMO directed the parties to produce an extracted text file or searchable version for 
each electronic document.110 Thus, the CMO expressly required significant technical 
processing of an electronic document as part of the process of producing a copy to 
the opposing party. 
                                                                                                                                         
 102 Mann v. Heckler & Koch Defense, Inc., No. 1:08cv611 (JCC), 2011 WL 1599580, at *9 
(E.D. Va. 2011). 
 103 In re Scientific–Atl., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 1:01-CV-1950-RWS, 2011 WL 2671296, at 
*1 (N.D. Ga. 2011). 
 104 In re Fast Memory Erase v. Spansion, Inc., No. 3-10-CV-0481-M-BD, 2010 WL 
5093945, at *4 (N.D. Tex. 2010). 
 105 Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 106 Id. at 161. 
 107 These are different software programs that lawyers use to access ESI. They typically 
provide such functionality as searching, issue tagging, appending notes, etc. 
 108 Race Tires Am. Inc., 674 F.3d at 161. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
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The district court clerk’s office issued a Taxation of Costs which awarded all of 
the claimed e-discovery charges.111 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit considered which of these costs should be recoverable as “copies of papers 
necessarily obtained for use in the case.”112 Relying primarily on the definition of the 
word “copy,” the court held that the only e-discovery activities that were the 
equivalent of copying a paper document were the scanning and conversion to TIFF 
files.113 
The court also considered the other basis for recovery that parties often assert for 
e-discovery costs: the language in Section 1920(4) allowing recovery of “fees for 
exemplification.”114 Parties who rely on this language in Section 1920(4) argue that 
the manipulation of the electronic data is exemplifying the data. The court held that 
the “electronic discovery vendors’ work in this case did not produce illustrative 
evidence or the authentication of public records. Their charges accordingly would 
not qualify as fees for ‘exemplification’ under either construction of the term.”115 
Accordingly, the court ruled that Hoosier could not recover its e-discovery costs as 
costs of exemplification or costs of copies. 
About a year later, the Fourth Circuit weighed in, in Country Vintner of North 
Carolina, LLC v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, Inc.116 Country Vintner of North Carolina 
sued E. and J. Gallo Winery, Inc., for breach of contract. Gallo won the case on 
motions, and then sought its costs under Rule 54(d). Gallo sought approximately 
$110,000 in costs associated with the production of the discovery material, including 
costs for converting the original documents into non-editable files, initial processing 
of the ESI, extracting metadata, electronic Bates numbering, and copying the images 
onto CDs.117  
Like the Third Circuit in Race Tires, the Fourth Circuit court determined that 
“making copies” should be construed as “producing imitations or reproductions of 
original works.”118 This interpretation, the court concluded, was in league with the 
Supreme Court’s observation that taxable costs under Section 1920 were “modest in 
scope” and limited to “relatively minor incidental expenses.”119 This led the court to 
conclude that the conversion of native files to non-editable formats and transferring 
the documents onto CDs were the only costs that Gallo submitted that qualified as 
“making copies.”120  
                                                                                                                                         
 111 Id. at 162. 
 112 Id. at 167. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 165. 
 115 Id. at 166. 
 116 Country Vintner of N.C., LLC v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, Inc., 718 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 
2013). 
 117 Id. at 253. 
 118 Id. at 259. 
 119 Id. (quoting Taniguchi v. Kan. Pac. Saipan, LTD., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2006 (2012)). 
 120 Id. at 260. 
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The court likewise rejected Gallo’s argument that its ESI processing charges 
were taxable as “fees for exemplification.”121 The court decided that the modern 
interpretation of “exemplification” was the “act or process of showing or illustrating 
by example” or an “official transcript of a public record, authenticated as a true copy 
for use as evidence.”122 Gallo’s e-discovery costs did not qualify under this definition 
of “fees for exemplification,” so the court allowed Gallo to recover only the costs 
associated with “making copies.”123 Those costs amounted to only $218 of the 
$110,000 that Gallo incurred. 
Then, in December 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, applying Eleventh Circuit law, reversed Judge Thrash’s ruling in CBT Flint 
Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc.124 The Federal Circuit’s approach was similar to 
that adopted by the Third and Fourth Circuits, with a few minor twists. 
The Federal Circuit first adopted a narrow interpretation of the scope of copying 
costs that a prevailing party may recover, similar to that employed by the Third and 
Fourth Circuits.125 The court found that Section 1920(4) “allows recovery only for 
the reasonable costs of actually duplicating documents, not for the cost of gathering 
those documents as a prelude to duplication.”126 
The court then divided the process of producing ESI into three stages. In the first 
stage, “an electronic-discovery vendor copied (or ‘imaged’) computer hard drives or 
other ‘source media’ that contain the requested documents, replicating each source 
as a whole in its existing state.”127 In the second stage, the extracted documents were 
organized into a database. They were then indexed, decrypted, de-duplicated, 
filtered, analyzed, searched, and reviewed to determine which were responsive to 
discovery requests and which contained privileged information.128 In the final stage, 
the responsive ESI was copied onto media to be provided to the opposing party.129 
First, the court clarified that the district court may not award the ESI vendor’s 
charges for planning the production process, even if some or all of the planning 
relates to recoverable copying.130 With respect to the first stage—making a copy of 
the potentially relevant ESI to preserve it, the court noted that such a step was often 
necessary to producing a copy of the ESI without altering the metadata during the 
review process.131 Therefore, the court held, the prevailing party could recover those 
                                                                                                                                         
 121 Id. at 262. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc., 737 F.3d 1320, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 1334 (quoting Allen v. U.S. Steel Corp., 665 F.2d 689, 697 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1982)). 
 127 Id. at 1328 (citing Sedona Conference Glossary at 23). 
 128 Id. at 1328-29. 
 129 Id. at 1329. 
 130 Id. at 1330 (“[C]osts incurred in preparing to copy are not recoverable.”). 
 131 Id. at 1329 (“[I]t is often necessary—in order to produce a single production copy of the 
document’s visible content and of the metadata (where both are requested)—to create an 
image of the original source first and then to apply special techniques to extract documents 
while preserving all associated metadata.”). 
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preservation costs relating to the documents actually copied and produced, but not as 
to documents not copied and produced.132 However, the court further held that, if the 
parties were not producing metadata or if their process did not otherwise require 
imaging of data at the outset of the process, then the stage one costs might not be 
recoverable.133 
As to the second stage, the court found those costs categorically not recoverable, 
likening those activities to attorneys reviewing paper documents for 
discoverability.134 Finally, as to the third stage—converting the documents into the 
format for production and transferring copies onto the media for production—the 
court found the costs to be squarely within the contemplation of Section 1920(4) 
(and in fact the losing party had not contested costs for the third stage).135 
Although time will tell, it appears that Race Tires, Country Vintner, and CBT 
Flint Partners have settled the disagreement about which e-discovery costs are 
recoverable under Rule 54(d) and Section 1920(4). District courts have cited Race 
Tires close to forty times, with only one case declining to follow it.136 Country 
Vintner, a more recent and less groundbreaking decision, has only been cited eleven 
times, with no district courts declining to follow it.137 
Accordingly, unless a split in the circuits develops, it is likely that the majority of 
the courts will construe Section 1920(4) to include only a small fraction of the e-
discovery costs that a party necessarily incurs in the litigation process. Therefore, the 
next logical question is whether Rule 54(d) and/or Section 1920(4) should be revised 
to provide for the recovery of additional categories of cost.138 The next section of this 
article examines that question. 
V. THE LEGAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ALLOWING GREATER TRANSFER OF 
DISCOVERY COSTS 
The decision as to which party should bear which litigation costs and fees has a 
variety of implications and consequences, some societal and some practical. As 
discussed above, one of the noted features of the American jurisprudence system is 
the “American Rule,” pursuant to which, as a default matter, the parties bear their 
own legal fees regardless of who prevails in the litigation.139 Although the American 
Rule developed in part as a reaction to statutes setting rates for legal services, one of 
                                                                                                                                         
 132 Id. at 1330. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. at 1330-31. 
 135 Id. at 1332-33. 
 136 See In re Online DVD Rental Antitrust Litigation, No. M 09-2029 PJH, 2012 WL 
1414111, at ¶ 3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2012) (describing Race Tires as “well reasoned,” but 
declining to follow it and instead awarding the majority of the prevailing party’s e-discovery 
costs as recoverable under Section 1920). 
 137 CBT Flint Partners, LLC, 737 F.3d at 1333. 
 138 Given the courts’ holdings that Section 1920 limits the types of costs recoverable under 
Rule 54(d), the safest method of implementing the proposal set forth in this article would be to 
amend both Section 1920 to specify that costs beyond copying costs are recoverable in civil 
litigation, and Rule 54(d) to set forth the discretion and factors for awarding such costs. 
 139 See, e.g., Vargo, supra note 74, at 1569. 
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the policy concerns behind the American Rule is the notion that we are better off 
with easier access to the courts for plaintiffs with limited resources.140 The Supreme 
Court expressed this policy as follows: 
[S]ince litigation is at best uncertain one should not be penalized for 
merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit, and that the poor might be 
unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the 
penalty for losing included the fees of their opponents’ counsel.141 
Thus, the reasoning goes, requiring each party to bear its own attorney’s fees 
allows individuals believing they have been harmed by the conduct of a large 
corporate entity to bring lawsuits without the specter of bearing the attorney’s fees of 
the corporate defendant hanging over their heads should the individuals lose their 
lawsuits. 
While the benefits and costs of the American Rule have been debated for many 
years,142 and while the policies underlying the American Rule are relevant to a 
discussion of cost-shifting, we do not need to overturn the American Rule to allow 
the prevailing party to recover a larger portion of the discovery costs incurred during 
the litigation. The American Rule is philosophically opposed to shifting attorney’s 
fees to the losing party, but the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly 
distinguish between attorney’s fees and costs in this regard, and explicitly authorize 
the prevailing party to recover its costs.143  
Therefore, the question that this section will address is whether the American 
litigation system and the justice that it seeks to uphold would be enhanced or 
weakened by allowing the recovery of a greater portion of the costs incurred in the 
discovery process. I argue that the system would be improved by amending Rule 
54(d) and/or 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) to accord the trial judge the discretion to award 
some or all of a broad range of discovery costs to the prevailing party.  
The current system virtually guarantees in the vast majority of cases that neither 
side is made whole. Plaintiffs who persuade the jury or judge to rule in their favor 
may achieve moral vindication, but their ultimate recovery is typically drastically 
smaller than the amount by which they are found to have been harmed, reduced not 
only by the 33 or 40% contingency fee, but further reduced by the substantial e-
discovery costs not presently awarded. Likewise, a defendant who obtains a defense 
verdict on all counts has a comparably Pyrrhic victory. While e-discovery costs are 
only one component of this “justice gap,” closing that component of the justice gap 
in appropriate circumstances only promotes justice. 
There are two primary arguments advanced against imposing discovery costs on 
the prevailing party. The first tracks one of the rationales for the American Rule—
that the prospect of being saddled with enormous discovery costs would discourage 
                                                                                                                                         
 140 Id. at 1634-35. 
 141 Fleishmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967). 
 142 See Vargo, supra note 74, at § 2; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1). 
 143 FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1) (“Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides 
otherwise, costs—other than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party.”). But 
see Patrick T. Gillen, Oppressive Taxation: Abuse of Rule 54 and Section 1920 Threatens 
Justice, 58 WAYNE L. REV. 235, 238 (2012) (“In this Article, I argue that neither Rule 54(d) 
nor 28 U.S.C.A. § 1920 allow the taxation of discovery costs as a matter of law.”). 
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individuals having meritorious claims against corporations from pursuing those 
claims.144 The second is that after-the-fact shifting of these costs will not create the 
proper incentives to be cost conscious and efficient during the discovery process.145 
This article examines each rationale in turn. 
A. Shifting of Discovery Costs Does Not Create a New,  
Undesirable Barrier to the Courts 
As a starting point, if any shifting of discovery costs—or related attorney’s 
fees—violates a “bright line” standard and undesirably discourages plaintiffs from 
bringing meritorious claims, then the American system needs a wide-ranging 
overhaul. There are numerous situations in which a variety of costs and fees are 
shifted.  
For certain statutory claims, Congress has decided that society is better served by 
allowing the prevailing party to recover its attorney’s fees. For example, under the 
Clean Water Act, citizens are authorized to bring citizen suits in which they act as 
“private attorneys general” to seek enforcement of the Clean Water Act’s 
provisions.146 Section 1365(d) of the Clean Water Act authorizes the court to award 
costs of litigation, including attorney’s fees, to “any prevailing or substantially 
prevailing party”—plaintiff or defendant—when the court deems it appropriate.147 
The purpose of this two-way cost and fee shifting provision is twofold: to encourage 
citizens to bring meritorious actions and to discourage frivolous or harassing 
actions.148  
The civil rights statutes have a similar dual-purpose fee shifting provision, but 
with a twist. The section titled “Proceedings in vindication of civil rights” provides 
that, in any civil rights action, the court may, in its discretion, award “the prevailing 
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the 
costs.”149 Thus, the statute authorizes an award of fees to a prevailing plaintiff or 
defendant (other than the United States). However, the courts have developed 
different standards for plaintiffs and defendants. Courts will award fees to plaintiffs 
if they obtain even a small benefit, but courts will only award fees to defendants if 
the claim was frivolous, vexatious, unreasonable, or without foundation.150 Thus, in 
the civil rights context, Congress and the courts still want to encourage meritorious 
litigation and discourage frivolous litigation, but with the balance shifted towards 
encouraging meritorious litigation. 
                                                                                                                                         
 144 See, e.g., Mast, supra note 11, at 1844. 
 145 See, e.g., Gillen, supra note 143, at 271-77. 
 146 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012). 
 147 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2012). 
 148 See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. E.P.A., 484 F.2d 1331, 1337-38 (1st 
Cir. 1973) (discussing S. REP. No. 91-1196, at 38-39 (1970)). 
 149 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012). 
 150 See, e.g., Dangler v. Yorktown Cent. Schools, 777 F. Supp. 1175, 1177 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991); Tufaro v. Willie, 756 F. Supp. 556, 560 (S.D. Fla. 1991).  
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Other statutes provide for “one way” fee shifting, allowing a successful plaintiff 
to recover its fees but not a successful defendant.151 An example of a “one way” fee 
shifting statute is the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which allows a successful plaintiff 
consumer to recover attorney’s fees incurred in an action against a credit reporting 
agency that violates the procedures for credit ratings, but does not provide a 
comparable right to a successful defendant.152 
Overall, there are more than 200 federal statutes153 and almost 2,000 state 
statutes154 that provide for the shifting of attorney’s fees. Thus, both state and federal 
legislators have repeatedly found sufficiently compelling interests to override the 
American Rule.  
There are also common law exceptions to the American Rule. For example, the 
“common fund” doctrine is an equitable exception to the American Rule, allowing 
parties who create or preserve a common fund for the benefits of others to recover 
their attorney’s fees from the fund before it is distributed to the other beneficiaries.155  
Similarly, a number of federal courts, including the Supreme Court, have 
awarded attorney’s fees against a plaintiff for bringing an “unwarranted,” “baseless,” 
or “vexatious” action.156 Likewise, many states have frivolous litigation statutes that 
allow a party to recoup the fees and costs incurred in defending a frivolous claim.157  
                                                                                                                                         
 151 See Vargo, supra note 74, at 1589-90; MARY F. DERFNER & ARTHUR D. WOLF, COURT 
AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES, ¶ 5.02[5] at 5-8 (1992). 
 152 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (2008). 
 153 See Vargo, supra note 74, at 1588; DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 151, ¶ 1.02[1], at 109 
(1992), Table of Statutes, TS1-TS36 (providing an alphabetical list of statutes and cross 
references to appropriate sections that provide for an award of attorney’s fees); see also E. 
Richard Larson, Current Proposals in Congress to Limit and to Bar Court-Awarded 
Attorneys’ Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 523, 523-24 
(1986) (stating that the majority of court awards for attorney’s fees are presently based on 
express statutory provision rather than doctrinal theories such as common fund). 
 154 See State Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes: Are We Quietly Repealing the American Rule?, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 321, 336 (Winter 1984) (listing 1974 state fee-shifting statutes). 
 155 See Vargo, supra note 74, at 1579; Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 528 (1882). 
 156 See Vargo, supra note 74, at 1584; F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber 
Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129-30 (1974) (discussing various fee-shifting doctrines recognized by 
Court, including bad faith); Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S. R.R., 28 F.2d 233, 241 (8th 
Cir. 1928) (describing bad faith classes of English Chancery Court cases allowing fee awards 
and acceptance of such cases in U.S. courts, especially where courts of equity remained 
distinct from courts of law). 
 157 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN., § 9-15-14 (West 2001) (Attorney’s fees and expenses of 
litigation where attorney brings or defends action lacking substantial justification); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2591 (West 1992) (Frivolous action; costs and fees); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2A: 15-59.1 (West 1995 & Supp. 2014) (Frivolous complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim or 
defense of non-prevailing party; award of costs and attorney fees to prevailing party); OHIO 
REV. CODE. ANN. § 2323.51 (West 2004) (Definitions; award of attorney’s fees as sanction for 
frivolous conduct); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-825 (West 1953) (Attorney fees—Award 
where action or defense in bad faith—Exceptions). 
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We also allow parties to shift attorney’s fees by contract, often specifying that 
the loser pays the winner’s attorney’s fees and other expenses.158 Thus, shifting fees 
and costs to the prevailing party is not anathema to the American judicial system; the 
system does not promote the ability of parties without resources to access the courts 
to advance baseless filings, only those with at least a threshold level of merit. 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are also replete with cost and fee shifting. 
Rule 11 is perhaps the most well known. Rule 11 allows a court to shift both costs 
and attorney’s fees to a party taking a frivolous position, either in the case as a whole 
or on an issue-specific basis.159 The simple act of signing and filing a pleading, 
motion, brief, or other court paper certifies that the submission has a good faith legal 
and factual basis and is not submitted for an improper purpose like harassing or 
driving up the costs of an opposing party. Breach of this certification subjects both 
party and attorney to potential sanctions, and Rule 11(c)(4) explicitly includes 
imposition of the opposing party’s attorney’s fees and other expenses as a proper 
sanction.160 Thus, the American Rule yields when the plaintiff has filed a claim or 
taken a position, or a defendant has asserted a defense or taken a position, that the 
court deems to be insufficiently supported by the law or the facts or to be filed for an 
improper purpose. 
Rule 26(g) contains a provision for discovery papers that is analogous to Rule 11. 
It provides that the attorney signing discovery papers certifies that the disclosures are 
complete and accurate, and that the discovery requests, responses, and objections are 
consistent with the Rules and with existing law or by a non-frivolous argument for 
extending the law, are not interposed for any improper purpose such as harassment 
or delay, and are neither unreasonable nor unduly burdensome or expensive.161 As 
with Rule 11, breach of this certification subjects party and the attorney to sanctions 
including reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees.162 The certification under Rule 
26(g), therefore, is another context in which the American Rule yields to other 
concerns—the American system does not protect the rights of a plaintiff with limited 
resources to participate in the discovery process with no risk of bearing the 
defendant’s attorney’s fees or costs if the plaintiff does not conduct discovery 
appropriately.  
Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, addressing offers of judgment, 
does not shift attorney’s fees,163 but it does shift costs. Normally, as this article 
discusses, the prevailing party is entitled under Rule 54(d) to recover those costs 
specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1920. If the defendant makes a qualifying settlement 
                                                                                                                                         
 158 See Vargo, supra note 74, at 1578-79; United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 322 
(1910). 
 159 FED. R. CIV. P. 11; Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990) (the 
purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings and “streamline the administration and 
procedure of the federal courts.”). 
 160 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4). 
 161 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1). 
 162 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(G)(3). 
 163 Although Rule 68 is silent as to attorney’s fees, it is now settled law that it does not shift 
attorney’s fees. See, e.g., McCain v. Detroit II Auto Finance Center, 378 F.3d 561, 564 (6th 
Cir. 2004). 
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proposal in an offer of judgment under Rule 68 and the plaintiff does not accept the 
offer, then the plaintiff must bear the defendant’s costs incurred thereafter even if the 
plaintiff prevails, so long as the plaintiff does not recover more than the offered 
amount.164 Thus, Rule 68 subjects a plaintiff to the risk of paying the defendant’s 
costs even if the plaintiff succeeds, if the plaintiff improvidently declines the 
defendant’s settlement offer. 
The discovery rules also contain a variety of cost shifting provisions specifically 
oriented towards discovery costs. For example, Rule 26(c) authorizes courts to issue 
protective orders related to discovery. The rule specifically lists eight types of 
protective orders, and Rule 26(c)(1)(B) allows the court to specify the terms under 
which challenged discovery would be allowed.165 Courts use this provision to issue 
orders providing that if the requesting party wants to take the discovery in question, 
it must bear the responding party’s costs.166 Thus, under Rule 26(c), a court may 
issue a ruling that requires the plaintiff to pay the defendant’s discovery costs 
(potentially including some component of attorney’s fees) in order to obtain 
discovery in the case. Such an order may limit access to the judicial process for a 
plaintiff with limited means, but the rules balance this limitation against the burdens 
of gathering and producing information with marginal value—the concept of 
proportionality is deemed more important in this context than the principles 
underlying the American Rule. 
Rule 26 also contains a separate provision specifically authorizing shifting of 
discovery costs related to ESI. Rule 26(b)(2)(B) authorizes a party to decline to 
produce ESI that is “not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.”167 
In such circumstances, the court may order production of the ESI despite the undue 
burden or cost, but may shift the cost to the requesting party.168 Again, like Rule 
26(c), this provision authorizes the court to condition the plaintiff’s access to 
discovery of electronic media on the plaintiff’s paying the costs, and potentially 
some portion of attorney’s fees, of the defendant. And again, proportionality trumps 
the American Rule. 
Rule 37 contains a whole host of cost and fee shifting provisions as sanctions for 
various discovery conduct. One recurring theme in these sanctions is that the losing 
party pays the attorney’s fees and expenses of the prevailing party. Thus, under the 
provisions of Rule 37(a) authorizing parties to bring motions to compel opposing 
parties to comply with their discovery obligations, the court “must” require the 
losing party to reimburse the prevailing party’s expenses, including attorney’s fees, 
unless the court affirmatively finds that the party’s conduct was substantially 
justified or other circumstances render the sanction “unjust.”169  
Similarly, the sanctions provisions in Rule 37(b) for failure to comply with a 
Rule 37(a) order compelling discovery shift the prevailing party’s expenses and 
attorney’s fees to the losing party. This award of fees is also a mandatory component 
                                                                                                                                         
 164 FED. R. CIV. P. 68(d); Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 4 (1985). 
 165 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(B). 
 166 See, e.g., Kirschenman v. Auto-Owners Ins., 280 F.R.D. 474, 487 (D.S.D. 2012). 
 167 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
 168 See, e.g., Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630 (D. Kan. 2006). 
 169 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5). 
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of every sanctions award unless the court finds that the party’s conduct was 
substantially justified or other circumstances render the sanction unjust.170  
These discovery rules provide multiple examples of the American Rule yielding 
to the goal of promoting good faith participation in the discovery process. In short, 
while the American Rule may prohibit wholesale shifting of attorney’s fees at the 
end of every case, there are numerous exceptions where we shift some or all of the 
prevailing party’s expenses to the losing party. In fact, expense shifting is the default 
condition in the discovery arena.171 Therefore, shifting e-discovery costs at the end of 
the litigation is not inconsistent with the balance that the federal court system already 
draws with respect to awarding discovery costs at each other stage of the process. 
It is further important to note that the discovery rules do not mandate which party 
ultimately bears the discovery expenses; throughout the discovery process, the rules 
vest the court with extremely broad discretion as to whether to shift the expenses of 
discovery.172 Even in situations where the rules nominally require the court to shift 
costs and fees, the rules grant the court the discretion to decline to shift these 
expenses if it deems such an award “unjust.”173 Thus, at every stage of the discovery 
process, except at the end, the U.S. federal court system gives the judge discretion to 
shift discovery costs according to the equities of the specific situation. There is no 
reason to believe that vesting the courts with the discretion to reallocate discovery 
costs at the end of the case—the same discretion they already have at multiple 
intermediate stages—will create a new barrier to the courts. 
B. After-the-Fact Cost Shifting Will Not Incentivize Wasteful Behavior 
The second rationale in opposition to allowing the shifting of e-discovery costs is 
that it does not incentivize parties to be efficient in their e-discovery activities. The 
reasoning runs that parties will be most efficient in incurring costs that they know 
they will ultimately bear. If a party is sufficiently confident that it will succeed on 
the merits and be awarded its discovery costs under Rule 54(d), under this reasoning, 
it will either run up its discovery costs, or at least not try very hard to minimize its 
discovery costs because it will believe that the opposing party will ultimately bear 
those costs. Conversely, the party who will ultimately bear the costs has no ability to 
control or reduce them. 
There are at least two compelling fallacies with this argument. First, the 
percentage of cases that are resolved on the merits after discovery is quite small. 
Under two percent of cases filed in the federal courts go to trial.174  Approximately 
five percent of the cases that are filed are completely resolved by summary judgment 
                                                                                                                                         
 170 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(C) (providing that expenses and fees are to be awarded “instead 
of or in addition to,” the other listed sanctions). 
 171 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c), 37(a), 37(b). 
 172 See, e.g., Smith & Fuller, P.A. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 685 F.3d 486, 488 (5th 
Cir. 2012). 
 173 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2(C); Novak v. Wolpoff & Abramson LLP, 536 F.3d 175, 177 n.1 
(2d Cir. 2008).  
 174 See Judge Stanley Marcus, J, “Wither the Jury Trial”, 21 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 27, 28 
(2008) (finding in 2008, less than 1.3% of the cases filed resulted in a jury trial). 
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motion.175 Thus, in fewer than seven percent of the cases does the court make an 
adjudication on the merits resulting in a right to recover costs under Rule 54(d). In 
the other 93–95 percent of the cases, either the case resolves on an early motion 
without the incurrence of significant discovery costs or the case settles. Even a very 
confident party would be foolish to incur discovery costs wantonly with only a seven 
percent likelihood of reaching a result on the merits entitling the successful party to 
recover its costs. 
Second, with the unpredictable nature of judges and juries, no seasoned litigator 
should guarantee a winning result. Even in an extremely strong case where the 
litigator is willing to forecast an 80% chance of winning, that leaves a 20% chance 
of losing.176 So, if the litigator chooses to spend $200,000 of avoidable costs based 
on the hopes of shifting those costs to the opposing party if successful, in 20% of the 
cases the litigator’s own client will bear the costs. Or, on a weighted average basis, 
the decision to spend $200,000 of avoidable costs on average costs the client 
$40,000, with no benefit.  
Combining these two considerations, a party or litigator deciding whether to 
manage e-discovery costs prudently or wantonly should recognize that it will only 
have the potential to recover the costs in the approximately 7% of the cases that are 
adjudicated on the merits, and thus have a prevailing party. Of those 7% that are 
adjudicated on the merits after discovery, if the litigator estimates an 80% chance of 
winning, it will recover its costs 5.6% of the time, and not recover its costs 94.4% of 
the time. Returning to our example where the party has the choice of incurring 
$200,000 of avoidable e-discovery costs, that decision would cost the party $188,800 
on a weighted average basis. Very few practical businesspersons would recklessly 
incur unnecessary costs with those odds.177 Therefore, it seems quite unlikely that 
altering Rule 54(d) and/or Section 1920(4) to allow awarding of additional e-
discovery costs would drive up the costs of discovery. 
                                                                                                                                         
 175 It is extremely difficult to determine the precise percentage of cases that are resolved on 
summary judgment motion. Joe S. Cecil, et al., A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment 
Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. (Issue 4) (2007). For a 
discussion of the difficulties in gathering accurate data. The Federal Judicial Center conducted 
an analysis from 1975 to 1980. CECIL, ET AL., supra note 1. This study estimated that in 2000, 
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therefore this article will use 5% as its estimate, recognizing that the concepts do not change 
with even a 100% change in the percentages. 
 176 And these figures do not even account for the possibility that the judge might not award 
some or all of the costs even if the party wins. 
 177 It cannot be doubted that many parties in litigation do not always act rationally. For a 
discussion of the issue see Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality 
Should Not be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 
67, 67 (2002). However, that irrational behavior rarely if ever results in the party instructing 
its attorneys to run up the legal fees and expenses wantonly, with no strategic or punitive 
objective. Id. 
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An analogous argument was advanced against the cost shifting that occurs in the 
context of offers of judgment under Rule 68.178 The argument was that, having made 
an offer of judgment, a defendant would no longer be incentivized to contain its 
costs, believing that it would eventually recover the costs from the plaintiff. This 
seems to have been empirically unsubstantiated in the context of Rule 68,179 and 
should likewise be rejected in the context of Rule 54(d).180 
C. Proposal: Allow Courts the Discretion to Award E-Discovery Expenses as Costs 
Appropriate access to the court system is certainly an important policy objective 
but perhaps easier to articulate than to achieve. The system should facilitate access to 
the courts for those with meritorious claims, even if they have limited resources, by 
insulating them from ruinous consequences if they pursue meritorious claims that 
simply happen not to succeed. Conversely, the system should not encourage those 
with frivolous claims to file them, buoyed by the hope of extracting a settlement 
with little to no downside. 
As applied to the award of discovery costs to the prevailing party, the choice is 
not binary. In addition to categorically precluding recovery or routinely allowing the 
recovery of discovery costs at the end of the litigation, the system could vest in the 
trial judge the discretion to award such costs as she deems appropriate.  
This article proposes that the American judicial system would function more 
fairly and more efficiently if the rules authorized the court to award a much wider 
range of discovery costs to the prevailing party. As long as the courts continue to 
construe the current language of Rule 54(d), as limited by Section 1920(4), as 
narrowly allowing recovery of only a small slice of e-discovery costs, any expansion 
of the recoverable costs must come by amendment, ideally of both Section 1920(4) 
and Rule 54(d). 
This article does not propose that the award of the full range of e-discovery costs 
becomes mandatory. Rather, the courts should have discretion to award any 
discovery costs it deems equitable and appropriate following a final adjudication on 
the merits. In this manner, the courts can balance the competing policy objectives of 
fostering access to the courts for those plaintiffs with limited resources and of 
protecting defendants from financial pressure to settle spurious claims to avoid high 
e-discovery costs.  
There are multiple factors that the courts might consider in this analysis, and 
these could be enumerated in a non-exclusive list in the rule, described in the 
comments, or left to the judges’ discretion. These factors could include: 
 
                                                                                                                                         
 178 See Kevin F. Amatuzio & Joyce L. Jenkins, Application of the “Offer of Settlement” 
Statute: Less Than Legislative Intent?, 24 COLO. LAW. 2557, 2557 (Nov. 1995).  
 179 Id. (“[U]nlikely that any significant proportion of litigants will generate exorbitant or 
unnecessary litigation expenses merely in the hope of ‘punishing’ an opponent who declines 
an offer of settlement.”). 
 180 Indeed, some have argued that uncertainty about who will bear the e-discovery costs (as 
in the model proposed in this article) provides the best incentive for the parties to manage 
their costs efficiently. See, e.g., Matthew Prewitt, E-Discovery: An Uncertain Standard for 
Cost Shifting Can Restore a Level Playing Field, INSIDE COUNSEL (July 10, 2012), 
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/07/10/e-discovery-an-uncertain-standard-for-cost-shiftin. 
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 1) The nature of the discovery activities that led to the incurrence of the 
discovery costs. Considerations under this factor might include the reasonableness 
and burdensomeness of the requests, whether the activities were driven by 
procedures to which the parties agreed in advance, the manner of the parties’ storage 
of the ESI, and the extent to which the activities are substitutes for legal fees—so 
that the court might be more likely to shift costs incurred in response to discovery 
that was aggressive or overly broad, more likely to shift costs if the requesting party 
had agreed to the procedures, less likely to shift costs driven by the producing 
party’s chosen manner of storage, and less likely to shift costs that are the equivalent 
of legal fees; 
 
2) The actual benefits achieved through the expenditure of the discovery costs—
the courts might be less likely to shift the costs of discovery that generated 
meaningful, non-duplicative information; 
 
3) The parties’ efforts to minimize costs or lack thereof, and their sophistication 
and prior experience with e-discovery—such that the court can decline to award 
costs that the court deems to be unnecessary, inflated, or the result of 
mismanagement; and 
 
4) The merits of the claims and defenses—not necessarily who won the case, but 
whether, at the end of the process, the court concludes that the parties’ positions 
were non-frivolous and asserted in good faith. 
 
Further clarity as to which party would ultimately bear which costs could easily 
be built into the system. At the initial planning phase, the parties could discuss which 
discovery costs would be taxable at the Rule 26(f) conference and could incorporate 
issues relating to taxation of discovery costs into their report to the court. The judge 
could address taxation of discovery costs during the initial Rule 16 conference and 
could incorporate taxation concepts into the case management order.  
As discovery proceeds, there are further opportunities to bring taxation issues to 
the front. In ruling on a motion for protective order under Rule 26(c) or a motion to 
compel under Rule 37(a), the court could order that certain discovery could occur 
but explicitly state that such costs would be taxable at the end of the case.181 
Under this approach, the court could protect access to the courts by shielding 
from these costs unsuccessful plaintiffs with meritorious claims who did not try to 
use the discovery process to harass or unduly burden the defendants. Furthermore, 
successful plaintiffs could be made more whole if they are able to recover their e-
discovery costs under appropriate circumstances. 
Conversely, a more flexible approach gives the courts another tool to try to 
address some of the problems created by spiraling e-discovery costs. Neither party 
can drive up the opponent’s e-discovery costs with impunity, knowing that those 
costs cannot be imposed on it at the end of the case. 
                                                                                                                                         
 181 Steven C. Bennett, Are E-Discovery Costs Recoverable by a Prevailing Party?, 20 ALB. 
L.J. SCI. & TECH. 537, 555 (2010); see also Overlap, Inc. v. Alliance Bernstein Inv. Inc., No. 
07-0161-CV-W-ODS, 2008 WL 5780994, at *2-3 (W.D. Mo. 2008) (ordering the defendant to 
recover and produce data from backup tapes, and noting that “[T]his expense qualifies as a 
component of the cost to be awarded to the prevailing party”). 
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This approach has numerous advantages over the current system where courts 
have the discretion to shift e-discovery costs during the litigation but not afterwards. 
While it certainly can make sense to shift e-discovery costs during the discovery 
process, the courts can make a more effective and informed exercise of that 
discretion at the end of the litigation. 
In the middle of a lawsuit, we have accorded judges the discretion to impose a 
variety of costs on a plaintiff, even one with minimal resources. The court can rule 
that a plaintiff cannot have access to a collection of documents unless the plaintiff 
pays the costs of gathering and producing them.182 The court makes these 
determinations based on the information that the parties provide to the court—
information that can include the parties’ financial wherewithal, the merits of the 
claims, and the likelihood that the discovery will generate important information 
affecting the merits. 
Thus, the judge is forced to make this determination about who should pay the 
costs of discovery with incomplete information. The judge is typically balancing the 
potential benefit of the discovery—the likelihood that it will generate probative, non-
duplicative information—against the cost and burden.183 The more remote the 
prospects of important evidence, the more likely the court is to tell the requesting 
party that it can only have access to the discovery if it bears the cost. Yet, the judge 
is asked to make this determination with only the parties’ representations, largely 
based on speculation as to what evidence the discovery might generate.  
Likewise, the judge makes an evaluation of the merits of the claim with 
incomplete information. Under the current rules, the court must make determinations 
about shifting the costs of discovery before the parties have conducted that 
discovery, and thus without knowing whether the plaintiff has an extremely strong 
case or a weak or frivolous case and whether the defendant has a meritorious defense 
or a weak or frivolous defense. Therefore, while a judge may reasonably be more 
inclined to require a party to bear the costs of trying to develop a wildly speculative 
claim or defense, the court has only very limited knowledge about the nature of the 
claims and defenses at the outset of the case. 
Thus, at the beginning of the case when the judge is authorized to shift discovery 
costs, the judge has limited knowledge about the need for the discovery and the 
merits of the parties’ positions. In contrast, at the end of the case, after discovery has 
concluded and the court has reached an adjudication on the merits, the court has 
perfect knowledge about the benefits of the discovery and a judicial determination 
about the merits of the parties’ positions. It is difficult to conceive of a persuasive 
policy reason why it should be appropriate for the judge to shift discovery costs in 
the middle of the case with imperfect knowledge, but inappropriate for the court to 
make that same determination at the end of the case with perfect knowledge. 
Hindsight is twenty-twenty, and it seems beyond doubt that a judge could more 
fairly allocate discovery costs at the end of the case using that hindsight.184 
                                                                                                                                         
 182 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(B). 
 183 See BAICKER-MCKEE, WILLIAM M. JANSSEN & JOHN CORR, FEDERAL CIVIL RULES 
HANDBOOK, Part III (2014 ed.) (Rule 26(c), and the cases cited therein). 
 184 One might argue that it is unfair to use hindsight to allocate these costs when the parties 
are forced to make their discovery requests and responses without the benefit of this hindsight. 
In other words, if a party seeks discovery with a perceived high likelihood of uncovering 
important evidence, and instead the discovery yields no fruit, that party should be penalized 
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Put another way, if shifting discovery costs in the early stages of the discovery 
process does not unduly chill access to the courts, it is unlikely that the prospect of 
an award of such costs at the end of the case would. Remember that less than seven  
percent of the cases are adjudicated on the merits after discovery, and thus eligible 
for Rule 54(d) cost shifting of discovery expenses. And remember that the plaintiff 
will win some percentage of those cases, so it is only exposed to the potential of a 
discovery cost award in some fraction of the seven percent of cases that are 
adjudicated on the merits. 
One counterargument might be that a plaintiff could decide to forgo the 
discovery if the court indicated that the plaintiff would have to pay the costs before 
the discovery occurred (such as in the context of a Rule 26(c) motion for a protective 
order). This would allow a plaintiff to make a more informed cost-benefit decision as 
to whether to pursue certain discovery. However, the trade-off is that the plaintiff 
can seek any e-discovery with virtual impunity under the current system. If parties 
need to consider the possibility that they ultimately may bear the costs of discovery 
they seek, they will be more measured and thoughtful in their requests—something 
that can only improve the current system.  
Another counterargument might be that this approach would lead to additional 
motion practice for the courts. This would be a small cost, however, as fewer than 
twelve percent of the cases are eligible for Rule 54(d) costs following an 
adjudication on the merits after discovery is conducted. Moreover, courts frequently 
have some involvement in disputed costs under the current system, so the additional 
burden on the courts would be minimal. 
The principles that already led the Supreme Court and Congress to authorize the 
courts to shift discovery costs during the discovery process favor extending that 
authority to cost shifting at the end of the litigation as well. We allow judges to 
award costs and even attorney’s fees in numerous contexts. We allow judges to shift 
discovery costs at the outset of discovery, with limited information about the facts 
that are relevant to the court’s decision. We should allow courts that same discretion 
at the end of the litigation when they have more complete information and can make 
a better decision considering all of the circumstances. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The problem of spiraling e-discovery costs and their effects on the civil litigation 
system is complex and not easily resolved—the problem likely will require multiple 
rule revisions and court action. Certainly, giving courts the discretion to award e-
discovery costs to the prevailing party will not solve the problem by itself, but it will 
provide another tool to try to ensure that these costs are allocated as equitably as 
possible. 
  
                                                                                                                                         
for not being clairvoyant. However, with a flexible test, the court could take the 
reasonableness of the parties’ expectations into account. 
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